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ability, through different examinations of critiques, roots and different ap-
plication of Rawls’s central concept, the concept of the original position. The 
book is suitable for people (in my opinion, especially students) who want to 
learn more about the foundations of the contemporary political philosophy 
but also for advanced readers and professors who want to tackle serious 
problems that are discussed in the collection. Hinton managed to collect 
papers that give a great overview because they cover a multitude of ap-
proaches to the original position.
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Imagination has become a fashionable topic, and its role in procuring knowl-
edge has become a central challenge in the analytical debate on imagination 
(see, for instance, the 2006 issue of Metaphilosophy under the same title as 
the present collection, Knowledge through imagination). The present collec-
tion offers a well-organized range of interesting and challenging contribu-
tions. They are divided into three groups, the fi rst encompassing taxonomi-
cal and architectural issues (featuring papers by M. Balcerak Jackson, P. 
Langland-Hassan and N. Van Leeuwen), and the second offering “optimistic 
approaches” (T. Williamson, J. Jenkins Ichikawa, the co-editor A. Kind her-
self, and J. Church). The optimism is balanced in the third part, featuring 
“skeptical approaches” by H. Maibom, Sh. Spaulding and by the co-editor P. 
Kung. I shall choose a paper or two from each group, with apologies to the 
rest of the authors. (For quotations, I put page numbers in brackets.)
Let me start with the “Introduction” by the editors. They note that “the 
puzzle of imaginative use concerns two distinct and seemingly incompatible 
uses to which imagination is often put. (1) Sometimes it is an escape from 
reality, and sometimes it is “used to enable us to learn about the world as it 
is, as when we plan or make decisions or make predictions about the future. 
But how can the same mental activity that allows us to fl y completely free 
of reality also teach us something about it?” (Ibid.) How is the “instruc-
tive use” of imagination possible? The editors optimistically hope that a 
closer analysis will explain the joint possibility of the two uses, in particular 
the instructive one, and see the key to the explanation in constraints that 
thinkers-imaginers put upon their activity. The constraints come in two 
kinds. First, they “may be architectural; that is, they may result from our 
cognitive psychological architecture.” (22) Second, the constraints may de-
rive from more spontaneous sources, such as limitations that we voluntarily 
impose upon our imaginative projects (Ibid).
Amy Kind develops these ideas further in her paper “Imagining Un-
der Constraints”. She offers a characterization of imagining that involves 
a more active effort of mind than does supposition or entertaining a prop-
osition (148), and quotes Kendall L. Walton’s (1990) classic Mimesis as 
Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts (Harvard 
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University Press), suggesting that imagining “is doing something with a 
proposition one has in mind”, Walton, p. 20, (Ibid.). She then proposes a 
conception of “ideal imagination” modeled on an entertaining science fi c-
tional story in which highly developed computing machines predict things 
in a cold, perfectly calculated way, marching step by step, with “irresist-
ible steps”. They obey the “reality constraint” in representing things, and 
the “change constraint”: “when their imaginative projects do require them 
to imagine a change to the world as they believe it to be, they are guided 
by the logical consequences of that change (151). She then mentions Tesla 
and Temple Grandin as human quasi-ideal imaginers. Her conclusion is 
optimistic: “in modeling our imagination on the ideal imagination of the ma-
chines, we are able to make epistemic progress the way they do, by steady, 
irresistible steps” (159).
Other authors on the optimistic side take similar steps, specifying the 
constraints imposed upon imagination. Peter Langland-Hassan in his rich 
paper “On Choosing What to Imagine”, concentrates on imaginings that are 
voluntarily and suitable for guiding action and inference. He lists three es-
sential components that guarantee the guiding power, fi rst, the availability 
of (top-down) intentions to start imagining, second, of lateral constraints 
that govern the development of the imagining, and third, the possibility of 
cyclical interventions by the subject and her intentions, in particular during 
a given imaginative episode (81).
In his contribution “Knowing by Imagining” Williamson joins the opti-
mistic crew and proposes a cognitive view of imagination, without forgetting 
its practical value i.e. the importance of practical matters (124); he talks 
about “a wide range of possible ends” and a possible practical evolutionary 
origin of imagination. Also, in his view fi ction is not central for imagination, 
as he pointedly remarks in the concluding sentence of his paper: “… if we 
try to understand the imagination while taking for granted that fi ction is 
its central or typical business, we go as badly wrong as we would if we tried 
to understand arms and legs while taking for granted that dancing is their 
central or typical business”(131).
Among cognitive functions the prominent ones are raising possibilities 
and assessing the truth-values of propositions (115). This requires cognitive 
qualities, like rational responsiveness to evidence (116) and the capacity 
to develop adequate scenarios: the imagination develops the scenario in a 
reality-oriented way, by default (116). Williamson does not call them epis-
temic virtues, but this is how a friend of virtue epistemology would describe 
them. They offer reliability: “…under suitable conditions, the method con-
stitutes a reliable way of forming a true belief as to what would happen in 
hypothetical circumstances” (117).
Williamson wisely stresses similarities between various exercises of 
imagination, using them to suggest that the most sophisticated among 
them, like thought experiments, are nothing special and mysterious. What 
about science? Williamson has a fi ne optimistic argument in favor of the se-
rious epistemic status of imagination in it: “One might suppose that, as sci-
ence progresses, the role of the imagination will increasingly be confi ned to 
the context of discovery, and that in the context of justifi cation it will gradu-
ally be replaced by more rigorous methods. But there is evidence to the 
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contrary. For rigorous science relies on mathematics, and so indirectly on 
the axioms or fi rst principles of mathematics. But when one examines the 
justifi cations mathematicians give of their fi rst principles, such as axioms of 
set theory, one fi nds unashamed appeals to the imagination”(123). He also 
stresses that thought experiments are part and parcel of the normal func-
tioning of imagination: “We simply reserve the term ‘thought experiment’ 
for the more elaborate and eye-catching members of the kind.” So much for 
Williamson’s cognitive view of imagination in general.
The fi rst issue that arises for the project is the classical philosophical 
one: what is imagination and what is the role of image in it? How close is it 
to belief? The term “cognitive” seems to suggest a very high degree of close-
ness; what about the differences? Take imagining a golden mountain: many 
people will stress the image in such an imagining, but how important is it 
exactly? Williamson notes that many of his examples “appear to involve an 
essential role for mental imagery, in some sense” (118), but he quickly adds 
that “… we should not over-generalize to the conclusion that all imagining 
involves imagery” (Ibid.). And in fact, he present the imaginative exercise 
differently, more as a matter of logic and even almost exclusively as a mat-
ter of logic and possibly quite sophisticated and complicated, with the full 
range of tableau methods in the foreground, continuing the venerable tra-
dition of Jaako Hintikka interpreting Kant’s notion of Anschauung (in his 
1969, “On Kant’s Notion of Intuition (Anschauung)”, in T. Penelhum and J. 
J. MacIntosh (eds.), The First Critique, Wadsworth Publishing).
On the other hand, here is how in his central example he presents the 
way people imagine. He invites us to think of a hunter who fi nds his way ob-
structed by a mountain stream rushing between the rocks (117). The hunter 
“imagines himself trying to jump the stream” (119) and presumably asks 
himself If I try here, what is it going to be like? Williamson notes that “he 
also has to look carefully at its banks in front of him, to tailor his imagina-
tive exercise as exactly as he can to their actual contours” (Ibid.). But this 
tailoring of one’s imaginative exercise to the contours perceived sounds a 
bit like creating a visual-kinesthetic moving picture, a video: it will be like 
this. (This is what is often called a mental model of the situation, and here 
imagistic, video-like properties might help a lot.) So, even if we accept that 
image-producing is not a necessary feature of imagination, it could be a cen-
trally important one, and the non-image-involving cases might be a bit mar-
ginal. In general, judgments are easy to elicit with concrete examples. With 
naive subjects it is the only way. However, Williamson stresses the impor-
tance of deductive logic and the “tendency of imagination to use something 
like rules of deductive logic…” (123). He notes “the role of the imagination 
as a standard means for evaluating conditionals and modal claims (Ibid.) 
This raises the important issue of the role of logic in relation to imagistic 
cognition. Like Peter Langland-Hassan, Williamson wants to combine the 
two, and it will be interesting to see what the results in his subsequent work 
will be. So much about the optimists.
On the skeptical side, the most direct challenge to the project of fi nding 
constraints that would rehabilitate imagination is to be found in the paper 
by Shannon Spaulding: “Imagination Through Knowledge”. On her view, 
the puzzle of how we arrive to knowledge through imagination suggests 
that imagination is “not suffi cient for new knowledge” (222). The argument 
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seems to be the following: if imagination is to be constrained by extra-imag-
inative pieces of information and by other abilities, then imagination does 
not bring new knowledge. But this is too severe a demand. Compare physi-
cal constraints. I commute from my home town to my working place about a 
hundred miles away. For the car to bring me to work there should be a well-
established and well-kept road, constraining the travel, there should be red 
lights helping to prevent crashes, and so on. Imagine someone arguing that 
therefore “the car is not suffi cient” for commuting, and is not doing any real 
work! Well, the fact that an item needs constraints to function properly does 
not entail that it never performs any function.
Spaulding has an auxiliary argument: “I have argued that the cognitive 
capacity to imagine scenarios is distinct from the cognitive capacities that 
underlie our ability to judge the accuracy of our imaginings” (222) and “…
there is nothing in the capacity of imagination itself that could evaluate the 
accuracy of the possibilities we imagine.” (Ibid.) Indeed, there is nothing in 
the car itself that recognizes the red/green light. This does not show that 
the car will not take me from home to work, only that car alone will not do 
the work. So much about Spaulding’s direct challenge to the instructive use 
of imagination.
Let me mention, however, that in her text the challenge is preceded by 
a rich and very provocative analysis of one particular kind of imaginational 
enactment, namely simulation. Her argument resembles the general one we 
just summarized. Her example is the following: I watch John tease Mary, 
and try to fi gure out why he is doing this. I simulate his activity, and end up 
concluding that John likes Mary and is trying to get her attention. Fine, but 
how do I choose this option rather than some other, equally plausible in it-
self, for instance that he is just humiliating her? I need additional informa-
tion, and my simulation tells me nothing about these matters. Again, to me 
it looks like simulation has done the main job, like the car in our example; 
the fact that the main job cannot be fully accomplished by the main agency 
in question tells little against it.
Heidi Maibom’s paper “Knowing Me, Knowing You: Failure to Forecast 
and the Empathic Imagination” joins in with bad news about people’s abili-
ties to recognize their own characteristics and attitudes, and abilities to 
project items of self-knowledge onto their neighbours.
Peter Kung’s “Thought Experiments in Ethics” is not so generally pes-
simistic as the papers by the two preceding authors. He just warns us that 
typical ethical thought experiments, especially ones that are meant to pro-
duce counterexamples to crucial ethical claims, CTEs for short, are orga-
nized around sharp, binary divisions, offering “forced choices with fi xed 
outcomes”: would you pull the lever, and kill three people, but save fi ve, or 
not? He develops his criticism in a rich and subtle way, connecting it with 
issues of imagistic (he calls it “pictorial”) vs. non-imagistic representations, 
with topics of modality and so on. He claims that “imagining CTEs gives 
us no reason to believe that forced choices with fi xed outcomes are genuine 
possibilities” (228, italics mine). We should use more realistic scenarios in 
our thought-experiments.
Let me note that real life often does offer “forced choices with fi xed out-
comes”: would you marry the person you are so passionately attracted to, 
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but whom you realize to be a very dangerous partner, or not?, would you 
vote for Trump, for Clinton or for Sanders, or not vote at all? So ethicists 
might hope to offer some answers to people facing such choices, and they 
might prepare themselves by going through imaginary exercises featuring 
them.
Let me conclude that the optimistic side might have chances to sur-
vive. And let me add the following: if we accept that imagination follows 
real-world (or quasi-real-world) constraints, the question arises where the 
representations of the constraints come from. One possible unitary answer 
is that thinkers have mental models of reality, and that, when they ask 
themselves an instruction-oriented question, the models available to them 
constrain their subsequent imagination. If the result is worth remembering 
and taking into account, it can be integrated back into one of the models, so 
that in the future it will provide a relevant “lateral constraint” to some ex-
ercise of imagination. If we assume that imagination is typically imagistic, 
and that mental models are typically concrete and “iconic”, but that both 
allow for thought processes that range from more iconic-pictorial to more 
digital deductive ones, then we shall notice that the two media, imagina-
tional and model-sustaining one, nicely fi t together and can interact in a 
non-problematic way.
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